periCORE

Single Pair Ethernet communication module



Datasheet

Perinet
Seamless IoT Connectivity

Abstract

This datasheet presents the *periCORE*, a versatile IIoT module designed for connecting sensors and actuators to a Local Area Network using Single Pair Ethernet. Its compact size makes it ideal for integration into sensor housings, linking them directly with the IT world. The module also supports multiple interfaces, accommodating a wide range of analog front-end ICs.

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1 Overview

The periCORE module serves as an Ethernet communication tool, designed for use with sensor and actuator devices. It enhances these devices by adding network functionality in hardware and software, simplifying integration. The module transforms passive sensors and actuators into smart devices capable of processing data and responding to events, and comes with built-in advanced network features such as state-of-the-art security and efficient firmware management. periCORE also supports easy rebranding and customization of devices, allowing anyone to develop customized firmware using the available development kit.

Targeted Applications

- Industrial sensors
- Industrial control
- IoT / IIoT
- Remote sensor access
- Building automation

Key Features

- Fully qualified Industrial IoT module
- Firmware development framework
- Provided TCP/IPv6 stack
- Event-based minimal operating system
- arm Cortex®-R4 250MHz processor core
- 32-MBit flash memory for persistent storage
- Up to 3x 100BASE-T1 Single Pair Ethernet Phys (IEEE 802.3bw compatible)
- Integrated Ethernet switching core
- Compact form factor
- Operated with 24V
- Integrated 3V3 power supply
- patent-protected

Interfaces

- 2 x 100BASE-T1 Phy (IEEE 802.3bw)
- 1 x Combined 100BASE-T1/TX Phy
- 1 x RMII | SGMII
- 1 x MAC to arm processor core (Figure 1)
- 1 x UART
- 1 x I2C (400 kHz ± 20 %)
- 2 x GPIO
- 1 x optional SPI (800 kHz ± 20 %)



Figure 1: periCORE hardware blocks.

Operational Parameters

- Operating voltage: 24 VDC
- Power supply: 3.3 VDC (up to 100mA)
- Temperature range: -40°C to +85°C
- Power consumption: 0.6 W

Package

Dimensions: 16.7 x 13 x 3.9 mm (Figure 2)

Mounting: Solder pads, 73 LGA-Pads, Pattern 13 x 10, Pitch 1.27 mm



Figure 2: periCORE dimensions in mm.

Compliance

- CRA ready
- RoHS 3 (EU 2015/863)
- WEEE (2012/19/EU)
- REACH

Security

- NIST compliant TLS implementation
- Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
- Certificate based client authentication
- AES encryption algorithm
- X.509 certificates & PKIX path validation
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

Software Library *libperiCORE*

- Rapid firmware development with *periCORE Development Kit* (see Figure 3)
- mDNS/LLMNR for name resolving
- DNS-SD for automated service discovery
- TCP/UDP endpoints
- TLS-based secure communication endpoints
- RESTful API
- Secure MQTT-client for publishing sensor values or subscribing to actuator commands
- HTTPs server including Web based UI
- Product lifecycle features
- C++20 standard conform



Figure 3: The software architecture with Custom Application template, provided by Perinet.

2 Module Architecture

The *periCORE* communication module is designed with various external interfaces to meet the demands of an IIoT Industry 4.0 setting. These interfaces are organized into three main blocks, each linked to the module's internal controller. A detailed illustration of these interface blocks is available in Figure 4. The diagram also includes the Micro Controller Unit (MCU), depicted as the 'Controller' hardware block.



Figure 4: Included hardware blocks of the *periCORE* communication module .

Network This includes three Ethernet communication ports compatible with 100BASE-T1 for SPE communication. Port 4 can be set to either 100BASE-T1 or 100BASE-TX. More information is available in Section 2.1.

Peripheral Interfaces The *periCORE* communication module offers I2C, 2-wire UART, and two GPIO ports for connecting and controlling OEM sensor or actuator products. Detailed information on these interfaces is in Section 2.2.

Power Alongside the 24V input, a 3.3V output is provided to power peripheral circuits. Details on the power block are in Section 2.3.

Controller This Micro Controller Unit (MCU) runs platform-specific firmware for sensor/actuator applications. It manages sensor/actuator data collection and configures network interfaces, as discussed in Section 2.4.

Watchdog An independent circuit designed to reset the *periCORE* communication module in case of errors. Further details are in Section 2.5.

2.1 Network Interfaces

The periCORE module is equipped with two Ethernet PHYs compliant with 100BASE-T1 (Port 0 and Port 1), and an adaptable PHY supporting both 100BASE-T1 and 100BASE-TX (Port 4). A 100BASE-T1 PHY can function in either master or slave mode, as defined by [19]. This physical layer creates a connection between a master mode 100BASE-T1 PHY and a slave mode 100BASE-T1 PHY. However, a link cannot be established if both PHYs are set to the same mode, either master or slave. Each port's mode (master or slave) is set during the bootup process and remains static. For port configuration details, refer to Table 1.

Port	Communication Standard	Default
Port 0	100BASE-T1(master,slave)	100BASE-T1(slave)
Port 1	100BASE-T1(master,slave)	100BASE-T1(master)
Port 4	100BASE-T1(master,slave); 100BASE-TX	100BASE-TX

Table 1: Network Interfaces of the *periCORE* communication module

Automatic negotiation for the master or slave mode of the 100BASE-T1 PHY is not specified in the IEEE 802.3bw standard [19] and is not a feature of the *periCORE* communication module module. Each port on the periCORE module is connected to a 100MBit full-duplex MAC, which is integrated with the switch core.

Note: Port 4 on the *periCORE* communication module can operate as either 100BASE-T1 or 100BASE-TX. This port must be configured accordingly.

2.1.1 Ports 0, 1 and 4 - 100BASE-T1

A typical application circuit using Ports 0, 1, and 4 for 100BASE-T1 is presented in Figure 5. This circuit also demonstrates the concept of hybrid cabling, which uses a single cable with two pairs of wires—one pair for data transfer and the other for power.

In the circuit, Port 0 functions as a 100BASE-T1 slave, while Ports 1 and 4 are set as 100BASE-T1 masters. Port 4 defaults to 100BASE-TX and must be manually configured for 100BASE-T1. The slave port (Port 0) connects to an M8 Hybrid Male connector (style 6J-M8CI [5]), while the master ports (Ports 1 and 4) connect to M8 Hybrid Female connectors (style 6J-M8C [5]). This setup ensures that the direction of power flow and the master/slave configuration are determined by the connector type. Power flows from a master (M8H Female connector) to a slave (M8H Male connector). The standards for both male and female M8 Hybrid connectors and their mating faces (6P-M8CI and 6P-M8C) are defined in IEC 63171-6:2021 [5].

Note: The circuit design shown in Figure 5 does not provide a 2 kV isolation for the data lines as required by the product safety standard IEC 62368-1:2023.



Figure 5: 100BASE-T1 typical application circuit

The circuit design for the *periCORE* communication module module follows the recommendations of OPEN ALLIANCE [2]. It includes the following components for each port (where x denotes the port number: 0, 1, and 4):

- Cx1, Cx2 - DC blocking capacitors with minimum voltage rating of 50V and 10 % tolerance
- Lx1 - common mode choke. Recommended parts are: Murata DLW31SH222SQ2#, Bourns SRF3216-222Y and Wurth Elektronik 744232222
- Rx1, Rx2 - common mode RF currents termination with 1% tolerance and minimal power rating of 0.4 W
- Rx3 - discharge resistor. Power rating > 0.1 W
- Cx3 - HF bypass capacitor with voltage rating >= 100 V and not more than 10% tolerance

- Cx4, Cx5 - Shield isolation capacitors with 1kV voltage rating
- Dx1 - ESD protection for power supply lines. Recommended parts are: Littelfuse SD24C-01FTG and Bourns CDSOD323-T24SC
- D2 - Reverse polarity protection
- Dx3, Dx4 - ESD protection for the data lines with capacitance < 3.5 pF
- J1, J4 - M8 Hybrid Female connector (TE connectivity T4040110044-000)
- J0 - M8 Hybrid Male connector (TE connectivity T4041110044-000)

Placement and layout guidelines:

- Dx1, Dx3 and Dx4 should be placed as close as possible to the connector.
- MDI (BI_DA) differential pairs should be routed as coplanar waveguides with characteristic differential impedance of 100 Ω ± 10 %. The traces should be kept symmetrical. The distance between the traces should be close to their width.
- Maximize the spacing between the MDI pair and other traces or power planes. A good practice is at least 5H edge-to-edge, where H is dielectric height.
- We recommend using the minimum number of 4 layers when planning the stackup of the PCB

2.1.2 100BASE-T1/TX Port 4

Port 4 is set by default to operate in 100BASE-TX mode. It incorporates a media access controller (MAC) compliant with IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.3u, and IEEE 802.3x standards (refer to [16] and [17]). The port's auto-negotiation feature, which follows IEEE 802.3u and IEEE 802.3ab specifications (see [15]), is enabled by default. In the 100BASE-TX mode, the MAC can automatically determine the most suitable duplex mode (either CSMA/CD half-duplex or full-duplex) based on the results of the PHY auto-negotiation. An example application circuit for Port 4 in 100BASE-TX mode can be found in Figure 6.



Figure 6: periCORE Port 4 100BASE-TX typical application circuit

The circuit consists of the following parts:

- J1 - HARTING iX Industrial Ethernet connector (HARTING 09452812560)
- L1 - LAN transformer (ABRACON ALAN-2202 or similar)
- C1, C2 - Capacitors, 22 nF, voltage rating >= 100 V
- R1, R2 - Resistors, 75 Ω, power rating >= 0.1 W
- C3, C4 - Capacitor, 1 nF, voltage rating >= 2 kV
- C5, C6 - Capacitors, 100 nF, voltage rating >= 100 V
- D1, D2 - TVS diodes, 2.5 pF capacitance (Littelfuse SP4020-01FTG-C or similar)

C1, C2, R1, R2, and C3 are components of the Bob Smith termination network, which helps terminate common mode signals. C4 provides a low impedance path for these signals between the primary and secondary sides of the transformer. Additionally, C5 and C6 connect the transformer's secondary windings' center taps to the ground potential for AC signals.

When placing and laying out these components, consider the following guidelines:

- Place D1 and D2 as close to the transformer taps as possible.
- Route MDI differential pairs (from the connector to the transformer and from the transformer to the periCORE module) as coplanar waveguides. They should have a characteristic differential impedance of 100 Ω ± 10 %. Keep the traces symmetrical and the distance between them approximately equal to their width.
- Ensure a significant distance between the MDI pair and other traces or power planes. Ideally, maintain a spacing of at least 5 times the dielectric height (5H edge-to-edge).

- Design the traces from C3 and C4 to the shield to have minimal inductance.
- For PCB stackup, a minimum of 4 layers is recommended.

2.1.3 Serial LED Interface

The periCORE module uses its Serial LED Interface to provide link status information for Ports 0, 1, and 4. This interface operates with two wires: LED_CLK (for the clock signal) and LED_-DATA (for data).

Data is transmitted as a serial bit stream on the LED_DATA pin, synchronized with the clock signal on the LED_CLK pin. For detailed timing information, refer to Section 5.3.

The bit stream is composed of 24 bits, and each bit is active-low. For every port, there are 3 bits indicating different statuses:

- 100MBit/ACT - This bit is active (low) when a 100Mbit link is established and toggles with any link activity.
- ACT - This bit shows link activity and toggles with any activity on the link.
- LNK - This bit indicates the presence of a link, being low when the link is established.

The specific arrangement of these bits in the stream is outlined in the table below.

Bit	Port	Description
0 - 4	—	Reserved
5	Port 4	100MBit/ACT
6	Port 4	ACT
7	Port 4	LNK
8 - 16	—	Reserved
17	Port 1	100MBit/ACT
18	Port 1	ACT
19	Port 1	LNK
20	—	Reserved
21	Port 0	100MBit/ACT
22	Port 0	ACT
23	Port 0	LNK

Table 2: Link status bit stream structure

To properly use the data provided by the Serial LED Interface, an external circuit equipped with shift registers is required. A diagram illustrating this circuit setup is available in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Serial LED interface typical application circuit

The circuit designed for the Serial LED Interface consists of three 8-bit shift registers linked in series. This setup allows the circuit to process the entire 24-bit stream from the interface. The link status bits provided by these shift registers can be utilized to create various LED indicators and blinking patterns, depending on specific application needs.

An example schematic is shown in Figure 8. This example demonstrates a setup with a green LED (D1) and a yellow LED (D2) programmed to behave as follows:

- D1 lights up when a network link is established and turns off otherwise, while D2 remains off.
- During network activity, both LEDs blink alternately - D1 turns on when D2 is off, and

vice versa.



Figure 8: Link Status LED implementation example

2.2 Peripheral Interfaces

2.2.1 I2C

The Inter-Integrated Circuit (I^2C) interface in periCORE is a serial bus system using two wires: SDA (Serial Data Line) and SCL (Serial Clock Line). I^2C is ideal for communication with various peripheral devices such as serial EEPROMs, A/D & D/A Converters, and different sensors. For more details on I^2C, see the I^2C-bus specification [21].

The periCORE supports the I2C interface with these characteristics:

- Operates in Fast-mode with a fixed bit rate of 400 kbit/s ± 20 %.
- Functions in Master mode within a single master bus architecture.
- Utilizes 7-Bit device addressing.

An example application of this interface is shown below. It illustrates a 0-10 V sensor interface with M12 4-pin connector, periCORE, and an external ADC. The analog signal from pin 4 of the M12 connector is first attenuated and filtered through resistors R_1, R_2, and capacitor C_1. The ADC then converts this attenuated analog signal into digital samples. periCORE reads these digital samples from the ADC via the I^2C interface and makes them available over the network. Power for the sensor is supplied through pins 1 and 3 of the M12 connector. Diodes D_1 and D_2 provide ESD protection and should be positioned close to the connector pins.



Figure 9: 0-10 V implementation example with I^2C

2.2.2 SPI

The Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) in periCORE is a serial bus system using 4 wires, SCLK (Serial Clock), MOSI (Master Out Slave In), MISO (Master In Slave Out) and nCS (Chip Select (low active)). The SPI interface does share its pads with I2C (N6 and N7) and the GPIOs (N2 and M2).

Note: The SPI function shares pads with I2C, GPIO1 and GPIO2 and therefore cannot be used simultaneously with them.

The SPI function is enabled by the *libperiCORE* based firmware [14]. The SPI feature is integrated within the *libperiCORE* since version 25. The Table 3 shows the default mapping of the SPI signals to the periCORE pads based on the pad specification of Section 4.2.

SPI Signal	Pad	origin Signal	Direction	Description
MOSI	M2	GPIO2	output	SPI Master Out Slave In
MISO	N2	GPIO1	input	SPI Master In Slave Out
SCLK	N6	GPIO4 / I2C_SCL	output	SPI Serial Clock
nCS	N7	GPIO3 / I2C_SDA	output	SPI Chip Select, low active

Table 3: Default SPI signals to pad mapping of the periCORE.

Note: The mapping of the SPI signals can be changed amongst the mentioned pads shown in Table 3 within the configuration of the *libperiCORE*.

The periCORE supports the SPI interface with these characteristics:

- Clock frequency is 800 kHz ± 20%.
- Functions in Master mode within a single master bus architecture.
- Supports SPI modes 0, 1, 2 and 3.

The SPI mode is configured via the internal interface of the *libperiCORE*. By default, the SPI mode 0 is used. An example firmware `periCORE-template-firmware` [14] provides a web interface for easy evaluation of the SPI functionality. In Table 4 the supported SPI-modes are summarized.

Mode	CPOL	CPHA
0	0	0
1	0	1
2	1	0
3	1	1

Table 4: SPI modes supported by the periCORE.



Figure 10: SPI mode timing overview.

2.2.3 GPIO

The periCORE module features up to two dedicated General-Purpose I/O (GPIO) pins (`GPI01` and `GPI02`) and two additional GPIOs (`GPI03` and `GPI04`) which are shared with the I2C interface.

These GPIO pins can be set up either as digital outputs or digital inputs, depending on the requirement. Furthermore, they can function bidirectionally by alternating between output and input modes through software configuration.

2.2.4 UART

UART, or Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter, is a hardware component utilized for asynchronous serial communication. This process involves transmitting data bits sequentially over a single wire. Each communication sequence begins with a start bit, followed by the data bits sent with the least significant bit (LSB) first. This may be followed by an optional parity bit and concludes with at least one stop bit. A common communication frame structure for UART is illustrated below:



Figure 11: UART frame structure

The periCORE module includes support for a single UART, which consists of two I/O pins: TXD for transmitting data and RXD for receiving data. Data transmission on the TXD pin occurs with the least significant bit (LSB) sent first. RXD is an input pin where data is received. Hardware flow control is not supported by periCORE; if needed, it must be managed through software methods like XON/XOFF[1].

The default configuration for UART on periCORE is as follows:

- Baud rate: 115200 Baud

[1] Software flow control is application specific and is not included in the *libperiCORE* package.

- 1 start bit
- 1 stop bit
- No parity

Additionally, the UART interface of the periCORE modules can support speeds up to 1.5 MBaud.

2.3 Power Block

2.3.1 Power Input

The *periCORE* communication module module is equipped with a step-down DC-DC converter that powers all essential functions of the module. Details on the input voltage range, current consumption, and other electrical parameters are provided in Section 4.3.

2.3.2 Power Output

The periCORE module also allows external peripheral circuits to utilize its internal DC-DC converter, providing a 3.3VDC output available at the `3V3_OUT` pin. This output includes over-current and short circuit protection. In the event of a short circuit, the 3.3V output will drop, rendering the periCORE non-functional until the short-circuit issue is resolved and the 3.3V supply is restored. Further details on the maximum output current and other electrical characteristics of the 3.3V output can be found in Section 4.3.

2.4 Controller Block

The firmware of the periCORE module operates on an ARMv7 MCU core. It utilizes a 32-MBit Flash memory for storing the periCORE firmware and other auxiliary data. The MCU operates at a clock frequency of 250 MHz and has 512 kB of available RAM.

2.5 Watchdog Block

The periCORE module includes a watchdog timer, designed to help the MCU recover from fault conditions. If the MCU fails to respond to the watchdog timer within a 5-second interval, the watchdog triggers a reset of the MCU. This 5-second detection window is fixed and cannot be altered.

For debug sessions the watchdog reset can be inhibited via the `DEBUG_EN` pad, see Section 4.7.

3 Mechanical Specification

3.1 Module Dimensions



(a) Top view

(b) Side view

(c) Bottom view

Figure 12: Mechanical dimensions

Symbol	Min.	Typ.	Max.
A1	1.1	1.3	1.4
A2	0.9	1.0	1.1
A3	3.8	3.9	4.0
E	12.8	13.0	13.2
D	16.5	16.7	16.9
b		0.635	
e		1.27 BSC	

Table 5: periCORE dimensions (in mm)

3.2 Recommended Footprint



Figure 13: Recommended footprint (top view) for the periCORE module.

Symbol	Min.	Typ.	Max.
D	–	16.7	–
D1	7.9	–	8.3
E	–	13.0	–
E1	9.3	–	9.7
R	–	–	1.0
f	–	1.6	–

(a) Framing

Symbol	Value
r	50 %
b	0.635
e	1.27 BSC
g	0.635

(b) Pads

Table 6: periCORE footprint dimensions in mm.

All pads should be NSMD (Non Solder Mask Defined).

4 Electrical Specification

4.1 Signal Types

Type Name	Description
A	Analog pin type
D	Digital pin type
GND	Ground
I/O	Bidirectional
I	Input directional pin
O	Output directional pin
PD	With internal pull-down
PU	With internal pull-up
PWR	Power supply pin
PWRO	Power supply output pin
CFG	Configuration pin

Table 7: Signal Type Definitions

4.2 Pad Configuration and Functions

The configuration and functions of the pads of the periCORE are described in Table 8.

Pad	Signal	Type	Description
A2	P4_BI_DA-/TX-	A, I/O	Port 4, 100BASE-T1/100BASE-TX(TX) PHY Differential pair negative terminal
A3	P4_BI_DA+/TX+	A, I/O	Port 4, 100BASE-T1/100BASE-TX(TX) PHY Differential pair positive terminal
A4	P1_BI_DA-	A, I/O	Port 1, 100BASE-T1 PHY Differential pair negative terminal
A5	P1_BI_DA+	A, I/O	Port 1, 100BASE-T1 PHY Differential pair positive terminal
A6	P0_BI_DA+	A, I/O	Port 0, 100BASE-T1 PHY Differential pair positive terminal
A7	P0_BI_DA-	A, I/O	Port 0, 100BASE-T1 PHY Differential pair negative terminal
A8	24VDC_IN	PWR	24V DC input power
A9	Reserved		Do not connect
A10	GND	GND	electrical Ground
B1	GND	GND	electrical Ground

Pad	Signal	Type	Description
B2	SG_RXVDD	PWR	SGMII receiver analog power; if unused, connect to GND
B3	SG_TXVDD	PWR	SGMII transmitter analog power; if unused, connect to GND
B4	SG_PVDD	PWR	SGMII PLL power; if unused, connect to GND
B5	GND	GND	electrical Ground
B6	GND	GND	electrical Ground
B7	Reserved		Do not connect
B8	Reserved		Do not connect
B9	Reserved		Do not connect
B10	GND	GND	electrical Ground
C1	P4_N.C./RX+	A, I	Port 4, 100BASE-TX Receive (RX) Differential pair positive terminal; floating if port 4 is configured for 100BASE-T1
C2	GND	GND	electrical Ground
C3	Reserved		Do not connect
C4	JTAG_TDI	D, I, PD	JTAG Test Data In (TDI)
C5	JTAG_TCK	D, I, PD	JTAG Test Clock (TCK)
C6	JTAG_TRST_B	D, I, PD	JTAG Test Reset (TRST); Active low
C7	JTAG_TDO	D, O, PD	JTAG Test Data Out (TDO)
C8	JTAG_TMS	D, I, PD	JTAG Test Mode Select (TMS)
C9	Reserved		Do not connect
C10	Reserved		Do not connect
D1	P4_N.C./RX-	A, I	Port 4, 100BASE-TX Receive (RX) Differential pair negative terminal; floating if port 4 is configured for 100BASE-T1
D10	SGMII_DETECT	D, I, PD	SGMII signal detect; if unused, do not connect
E1	GND	GND	electrical Ground
E10	LED_DATA/JTAG_EN	D, O, PD, CFG	serial LED data output; JTAG enable configuration pin (sampled on power-on reset (POR))
F1	SGMII_TXDP	A, O	SGMII transmit, positive signal; if unused, do not connect
F10	LED_CLK / BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_3	D, O, PD, CFG	serial LED clock output; additionally sampled as boot-configuration strap at POR (see Section 4.6)

Pad	Signal	Type	Description
G1	SGMII_TXDN	A, O	SGMII transmit, negative signal; if unused, do not connect
G10	GND	GND	electrical Ground
H1	GND	GND	electrical Ground
H10	Reserved		Do not connect
J1	SGMII_RXDP	A, I	SGMII receive, positive signal; if unused, do not connect
J10	Reserved		Do not connect
K1	SGMII_RXDN	A, I	SGMII receive, negative signal; if unused, do not connect
K10	BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_1	D, I, PD, CFG	Boot-configuration strap sampled at POR (see Section 4.6); floating during operation; if unused, do not connect
L1	GND	GND	electrical Ground
L2	RMII_TXD0	D, O	RMII transmit data output; if unused, do not connect
L3	RMII_TXCLK	D, I	50 MHz RMII reference clock; if unused, do not connect
L4	RMII_TXD1	D, O	RMII transmit data output; if unused, do not connect
L5	RMII_TXEN	D, O	RMII transmit enable; if unused, do not connect
L6	RMII_RXER	D, I	RMII receive error; if unused, do not connect
L7	RMII_RXD0	D, I	RMII receive data input; if unused, do not connect
L8	RMII_RXD1	D, I	RMII receive data input; if unused, do not connect
L9	RMII_RXDV	D, I	RMII receive data valid; if unused, do not connect
L10	Reserved		Do not connect
M1	GND	GND	electrical Ground
M2	GPIO2 / SPI_MOSI	D, I/O, PD	General Purpose I/O or SPI Master Out Slave In; internal pull-down
M3	MDC	D, O, PD	SMI Interface: MDC; if unused, do not connect
M4	MDIO	D, I/O, PU	SMI Interface: MDIO; if unused, do not connect
M5	GND	GND	electrical Ground
M6	Reserved		Do not connect

Pad	Signal	Type	Description
M7	MII_VDD	PWR	RMII core power supply; if unused, connect to GND
M8	Reserved		Do not connect
M9	Reserved		Do not connect
M10	GND	GND	electrical Ground
N1	GND	GND	electrical Ground
N2	GPIO1 / SPI_MISO	D, I/O, PD	General Purpose I/O or SPI Master In Slave Out
N3	DEBUG_EN	D, I/O, PD	Debug enable; while held HIGH the watchdog reset of the module is inhibited; internal pull-down keeps the watchdog active when the pad is left unconnected (see Section 4.7)
N4	nRESET	D, I, PU	Active low; Reset signal to put periCORE into Reset state (see Section 5.1)
N5	3V3_OUT	PWRO	3.3V output power
N6	GPIO4 / I2C_SCL / SPI_SCLK	D, I/O, PU	General Purpose I/O or I2C Serial Clock Line (SCL) or SPI serial clock
N7	GPIO3 / I2C_SDA / SPI_nCS	D, I/O, PU	General Purpose I/O or I2C Serial Data Line (SDA) or SPI chip select (low active)
N8	UART_TX / BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2	D, I/O, PD, CFG	UART Transmit Data; additionally sampled as boot-configuration strap at POR (see Section 4.6)
N9	UART_RX	D, I/O, PU	UART Receive Data
N10	GND	GND	electrical Ground

Table 8: periCORE Pad mapping.

4.3 Absolute Maximum Ratings

Parameter	Min	Max	Unit
Supply voltage (24VDC_IN)	0	33	V
Output current (3V3_OUT)	0	100	mA
MII core voltage (MII_VDD)	-0.3	+3.63	V
SGMII core voltage (SG_RXVDD, SG_TXVDD, SG_PVDD)	-0.3	+1.10	V
Storage temperature	-40	+85	°C
A, D	-0.5	+3.63	V

Table 9: Absolute maximum ratings

Warning: Exceeding the specified absolute maximum ratings may damage the periCORE device.

The periCORE module includes basic ESD (Electrostatic Discharge) protection features. However, to prevent electrostatic damage, especially to the MOS (Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor) gates, it is recommended to store and handle the device in conductive foam. This precaution helps safeguard the module from potential electrostatic damage.

4.4 Operating Conditions

Parameter	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
Supply voltage (24VDC_IN)	10	24	27	V
Current consumption (24VDC_IN = 24V; I_{3V3_OUT} = 0)	–	30	–	mA
Output current (3V3_OUT)	–	–	100	mA
MII core voltage (MII_VDD)	3.14	3.3	3.47	V
SGMII core voltage (SG_RXVDD, SG_TXVDD, SG_PVDD)	0.95	1.0	1.05	V
Ambient Temperature	-40	–	+85	°C

Table 10: Recommended operating conditions

4.5 Electrical Characteristics

Symbol	Parameter	Conditions	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
24VDC_IN						
V_{UVDT}	Undervoltage detection threshold	Falling	2.3	–	–	V
V_{UVDT}	Undervoltage detection threshold	Rising	–	–	2.9	V
C_{IN}	Input capacitance. [2]		–	10	–	µF
3V3_OUT						
ΔV_{p-p}	Voltage ripple	24VDC_IN = 27V; I_{3V3_OUT} = 100mA; C_L = 400 µF	–	–	30	mV
I_{3V3_OUT}	Output current		–	–	100	mA
C_L	Capacitive load on 3V3_OUT		–	–	400	µF
GPIO						
I_o	Output current		–	–	2	mA
V_{IH}	High-Level input voltage		2.0	–	–	V
V_{IL}	Low-Level input voltage		–	–	0.9	V
I_{IH}	High-Level input current		–	70	–	µA
I_{IL}	Low-Level input current		–	2.5	–	µA

Symbol	Parameter	Conditions	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance		40	56	106	kΩ
I²C						
I_o	Output current		–	–	2	mA
V_{IH}	High-Level input voltage		2.0	–	–	V
V_{IL}	Low-Level input voltage		–	–	0.9	V
I_{IH}	High-Level input current		–	70	–	µA
I_{IL}	Low-Level input current		–	0.7	–	mA
R_{PD}	Pull-up resistance		–	4.7	–	kΩ
C_b	Capacitive load on each I2C_SDA and I2C_SCL line		–	–	75	pF
UART						
I_o	Output current	UART_TX	–	–	4	mA
V_{IH}	High-Level input voltage	UART_RX	2.0	–	–	V
V_{IL}	Low-Level input voltage	UART_RX	–	–	0.9	V
I_{IH}	High-Level input current	UART_RX	–	2.5	–	µA
I_{IL}	Low-Level input current	UART_RX	–	70	–	µA
R_{PD}	Pull-up resistance	UART_RX	24	45	113	kΩ
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance	UART_TX	40	56	106	kΩ
Serial LED Interface						
I_o	Output current		–	–	2	mA
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance		40	56	106	kΩ
JTAG Interface						
I_o	Output current	JTAG_TDO	–	–	2	mA
V_{IH}	High-Level input voltage	All except JTAG_TDO	2.0	–	–	V
V_{IL}	Low-Level input voltage	All except JTAG_TDO	–	–	0.9	V
I_{IH}	High-Level input current	JTAG_TCK; JTAG_TDI; JTAG_TMS; JTAG_JTCE;	–	70	–	µA
I_{IH}	High-Level input current	JTAG_TRST_B	–	0.7	–	mA
I_{IL}	Low-Level input current	All except JTAG_TDO	–	2.5	–	µA
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance	All except JTAG_TRST_B	40	56	106	kΩ
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance	JTAG_TRST_B	–	4.7	–	kΩ
DEBUG_EN, nRESET						
V_{IH}	High-Level input voltage		2.31	–	–	V
V_{IL}	Low-Level input voltage		–	–	0.99	V
I_{IH}	Input leakage current		-70	–	70	nA
R_{PU}	Pull-up resistance	nRESET; V_{IN} = 0 V	25	40	55	kΩ
R_{PD}	Pull-down resistance	DEBUG_EN; V_{IN} = 3.3 V	25	50	55	kΩ
C_{IO}	Input capacitance		–	5	–	pF

Symbol	Parameter	Conditions	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
Port 0,1 and 4 MDI signals						
R_{in}	Integrated Termination on Differential MDI Pairs		—	100	—	Ω

Table 11: Electrical characteristics

4.6 Boot-Config Pins

The periCORE exposes three hardware boot-config straps (`BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_1`, `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2` and `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_3`) that are sampled only at power-on reset (POR). Their values are latched into an internal read-only register during reset and can be queried at runtime through the *libperiCORE* API. After the strap values have been latched, the underlying pads resume their normal pad function as defined in Table 8. A mid-operation change on these pads therefore does not change the latched strap value — a power cycle is required to re-sample the straps.

The strap signal must be stable across the sampling window for the latched value to be valid. Refer to Section 5.2 for the sampling-window timing parameter. Asserting a strap only after the sampling window has closed has no effect on the latched value.

Note: The strap values are latched into a module-internal read-only register at POR and are accessible only through the *libperiCORE* (since firmware version 25). The raw register is not exposed to customer firmware.

4.7 Debug Enable

The `DEBUG_EN` pad (`N3`) selects whether the module-internal watchdog (Section 2.5) is allowed to reset the MCU:

- `DEBUG_EN` LOW — normal operation. The watchdog resets the MCU when the firmware fails to serve it within the detection window.
- `DEBUG_EN` HIGH — debug operation. The watchdog reset is inhibited, so an MCU halted at a breakpoint or single-stepped through code is not reset while the debug session is running.

The pad has an internal pull-down (see Table 11), so the watchdog is active whenever `DEBUG_EN` is left unconnected. To inhibit the watchdog, the signal must be driven above V_{IH} by an external source strong enough to overcome the internal pull-down, and it must be held HIGH for the entire debug session — as soon as it returns LOW, the watchdog is armed again.

Note: `DEBUG_EN` is intended for debug sessions only. In series designs the pad is left unconnected or tied LOW, otherwise the product loses the watchdog as its recovery path from firmware fault conditions.

[2] The inrush current is limited by the external resistance.

5 Timing Specification

This section defines the timing requirements that customer circuitry must respect when interfacing with the periCORE module. The parameters below cover the module's power-on / off and reset behavior (Section 5.1), the latching window of the boot-configuration straps (Section 5.2), the Serial LED Interface (Section 5.3), and the JTAG Interface (Section 5.4). Unless explicitly noted, all values apply across the recommended operating conditions of Table 10.

5.1 Power On/Off and Reset Sequence



Figure 14: Power On/Off and Reset timing diagram.

Symbol	Parameter	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
$T_{1.1}$	24VDC_IN slew rate [3]	—	—	8	V/ms
$T_{1.2}$	Period after Power-on in which power supply (24VDC_IN) must not be interrupted [4].	310	—	—	ms
$T_{1.3}$	Time between Power-off and the next Power-on [5]	6	—	—	ms
$T_{2.1}$	From Power-on to stable 3V3_OUT (I_{3V3_OUT} = 0)	—	—	1.3	ms
$T_{2.2}$	3V3_OUT rise time[6]	—	—	2.5	ms
$T_{3.1}$	Duration of nRESET pulse	8	—	—	µs
$T_{4.1}$	Delay from Power-on to the POR	—	—	400	µs
$T_{4.2}$	Duration of POR	—	310	—	ms
$T_{4.3}$	Delay from nRESET assertion to entering RESET state	—	—	8	µs

Symbol	Parameter	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
$T_{4.4}$	Delay from nRESET deassertion to entering NOMINAL mode	—	310	—	ms
$T_{4.5}$	Period after nRESET deassertion in which power supply must not be interrupted[4]	310	—	—	ms

Table 12: Power On/Off and Reset timing

5.2 Boot-Config Pins

The boot-config straps `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_1`, `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2` and `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_3` are sampled once, at the entry into periCORE's normal operation state (NOMINAL) — that is, immediately after a power-on reset (POR) or a reset (RESET) event (see Section 5.1). The strap level must be stable across the sampling window for the latched value to be valid. Once the sampling window closes, the strap value is frozen for the rest of the operating cycle and the underlying pads resume their normal function as defined in Table 8; subsequent transitions on the pads do not affect the latched strap. Refer to Section 4.6 for the pad assignment.



Figure 15: Boot-Config Pin sampling timing diagram.

Symbol	Parameter	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
T_1	Boot-Config Pin strap sample time	—	—	400	ms

Table 13: Boot-Config Pin timing

Note: The straps are evaluated by the firmware only after the module has released reset. The strap value is therefore available to the application no earlier than T_1 after nRESET deassertion or after POR.

[3] This condition must not be violated
[4] Interruption means any time the supply voltage drops below V_{UVDT}
[5] This effectively means that `24VDC_IN` must stay below V_{UVDT} in this time period.
[6] The external capacitive load on the pin `3V3_OUT` must be taken into consideration in order not to violate this requirement.

5.3 Serial LED Interface

Timing specification regarding the serial LED interface is shown below.



Figure 16: Serial LED Interface Timing Diagram

Parameter	Description	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
T_{UPDT}	LED update cycle period	—	42	—	ms
T_{CLK}	LED_CLK period	—	320	—	ns
t_{CLKH}	LED_CLK high-pulse width	140	—	180	ns
t_{CLKL}	LED_CLK low-pulse width	140	—	180	ns
t_{CTD}	LED_CLK to LED_DATA output time	—	—	180	ns

Table 14: Serial LED Interface Timing

5.4 JTAG Interface

Timing specification of the JTAG Interface.



Figure 17: JTAG Interface Timing Diagram

Symbol	Description	Min	Typ.	Max	Unit
T_{TCK}	TCK period	40	–	–	ns
t_S	Input setup time	10	–	–	ns
t_H	Input hold time	10	–	–	ns
t_{OD}	TDO delay from TCK falling edge	–	–	14	ns

Table 15: JTAG Interface Timing

6 Factory Reset Options

A periCORE-based product can be reset to factory settings via two distinct methods: a *software-initiated* reset and a *hardware-initiated* reset.

The software-initiated reset is performed through the RESTful API (Section 7.3.6). It requires a valid mTLS connection authenticated with an admin client certificate.

The hardware-initiated reset is intended for situations in which RESTful API access is unavailable, for example when the admin mTLS certificate is lost. It requires physical access to the periCORE-based product. The mechanism that triggers the reset in hardware is application-specific: depending on the firmware and the surrounding circuit, an application can wire the trigger to one of the peripheral interfaces (Section 2.2) or, since *libperiCORE* 25, to one of the boot-config pins (Section 4.6 and Section 6.2).

The *periCORE production firmware* performs a factory reset in two cases:

- when it receives an authenticated request via the RESTful API (Section 7.3.6), or
- when no link is established on any of the active network ports (Port 0, Port 1 and Port 4) for 20 seconds after power-up (Section 6.1).

Note: *libperiCORE* 25 only exposes the underlying port-state query `periCORE::NodeEnvironment::get_inport_factory_reset();` the decision of *when* and *how* to trigger a hardware factory reset is owned by the application firmware. Application firmware that wires the trigger differently may use a different timeout or disable the link-timeout reset entirely.

6.1 Link-timeout factory reset

To initiate a link-timeout factory reset, ensure that the periCORE-based product is powered on (using `24VDC_IN`) but is not connected to any network through its active network ports (Port 0, Port 1 and Port 4). If none of these ports establishes a link within **20 seconds** of power-up, the production firmware triggers a factory reset, returning the device to its original factory settings.

6.2 Boot-config-pin factory reset

A factory reset can also be triggered deterministically, independent of the network-link timeout, by asserting a boot-config strap at a power-on reset (POR) or a reset (RESET) event. See Section 4.6 for the pad assignment, the *libperiCORE* accessors, and the electrical requirements (including the sampling-window timing).

The default policy of the `periCORE-template-firmware` [14] uses `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2` (pad `N8`, `UART_TX`) as the hardware factory-reset trigger. When this strap is latched high at POR or RESET, the firmware clears the persistent configuration during startup.

Note: Custom firmware may implement a different policy by reading `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_1`, `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2` or `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_3` via the `periCORE::peripherals::BootConfigPins` accessors and invoking the factory-reset logic accordingly.

6.3 Effects of a factory reset

A factory reset — regardless of whether it is initiated through the software path (Section 7.3.6) or one of the hardware paths described above — clears the entire *Operational Storage Area* of the periCORE-based product and returns it to the *OEM Production State* (Section 7.3.2). At a high level, the reset has three effects:

- all persistent runtime configuration is reverted to its default firmware values;
- all security material is reset to the default *OEM Security Data*; this disables mTLS and the associated client authentication (RBAC);
- any *Update Firmware Image* stored in the *Operational Storage Area* is invalidated, so on the next boot the device runs the *OEM Firmware Image*.

Warning: After a factory reset, the device boots without active mTLS authentication. Reconfigure the security settings before returning the product to operational use.

For the complete breakdown of the storage areas affected by a factory reset and the surrounding life-cycle states (*periCORE Production State*, *OEM Production State*, *Updated State*) and their transitions, see Section 7.3 and the firmware-side description in Section 7.3.6.

7 Firmware

The periCORE module is primarily intended for integration into OEM customer products. As a white-label product, its firmware architecture is designed to support enhancements and customizations by OEM customers. Perinet facilitates this by providing the necessary software development infrastructure, including the *periCORE Development Kit* [9] and an example application [10]. These resources demonstrate how to rebrand and adapt a periCORE-based product to meet specific customer needs in terms of functionality and appearance (refer to Section 7.8).

The firmware's source code is written in standard C++20 [18] and operates on a bare metal software environment. The minimal and simplified operating system (OS) [12] and the *libperiCORE* form the foundation of the firmware, both provided by Perinet. These components allow developers to focus on application development while implementing a *periCORE-based Custom Application*.

This section outlines the basic architecture and functional behavior of the periCORE firmware, along with its production handling and rebranding options.



Figure 18: General periCORE-based firmware architecture.

7.1 Firmware Architecture

The firmware for a periCORE-based product comprises three main components: the *sève OS*, *libperiCORE*, and the *periCORE-based Custom Application*, as illustrated in Figure 18.

periCORE-based Custom Application This layer contains the application-specific software that manages and communicates with platform-specific hardware. It also includes software for converting raw sensor data into meaningful metrics, such as translating a 0-10V signal into a distance measurement, as detailed in the periCORE Firmware Development Application Note [10]. Applications are developed in standard C++, utilizing the sève OS and Perinet's *libperiCORE*.

libperiCORE *libperiCORE* provides a comprehensive set of features (including security, product life cycle functions, network protocols, and hardware-dependent bus drivers) as a software library. It offers a standard C++20 compliant interface, intended for use in all periCORE firmware variants. More information on this library can be found in Section 7.7.

sève OS The sève OS serves as the foundational operating system for both the *periCORE-based Custom Application* and *libperiCORE*. It features a component-based architecture, facilitating well-structured application design. Components communicate exclusively through event channels, which are protected against race conditions. These channels function as part of a dataflow model, conveying both event occurrence and associated data. Activities within components are triggered by events and are executed cooperatively following a FIFO scheme with a run-to-completion approach. The sève OS is a Perinet technology, with further details available in the periCORE sève Operating System Datasheet [13].

7.2 Persistent Memory Structure

The persistent memory in a periCORE-based product is organized into various logical segments. These segments play a crucial role in representing the current state of the product's life cycle. A comprehensive overview of these memory segments is provided in Figure 19.



Figure 19: Structure of the persistent memory of a periCORE-based product.

The periCORE module has three distinct logical storage areas for different life states of a periCORE-based product: the *Perinet Storage Area*, *OEM Storage Area*, and *Operational Storage Area*. These areas correspond to the *periCORE Production state*, *OEM Production state*, and *Updated State*, respectively.

Perinet Storage Area In the manufacturing phase of the periCORE module, production-specific metadata (refer to Section 9.2) is saved in the OTP of this area. Additionally, the general *periCORE Firmware Image* is also stored here.

This memory area remains unchanged throughout the life of a periCORE module.

OEM Storage Area This segment holds the factory default data for the OEM customer, set during manufacturing. In case of a factory reset (see Figure 20), data from this segment is restored.

It also contains the device attestation certificate (see Section 7.5).

Changes to this memory area are not possible during the regular operation of the periCORE-based product.

Operational Storage Area Persistent modifications to a periCORE-based product, including the *Update Firmware Image*, runtime security data, and configuration settings, are saved in this area.

Data here is persistent across power cycles but is erased during a *Factory Reset* (refer to Listing 3).

7.3 Product Life Cycle

Figure 20 provides a summary of the various states and state transitions of a periCORE-based product.



Figure 20: The Different life states of a periCORE-based product.

7.3.1 periCORE Production State

When a periCORE module leaves the Perinet manufacturing facility, it is in the *periCORE Production State*. In this state, specific information is stored in the *Perinet Storage Area*, including:

1. The *periCORE Firmware Image*, designed primarily for production use.
2. Unique production-specific attributes such as MAC-Address, serial number, and production date (detailed in Section 9.2).
3. Unique attestation certificate information, confirming the module's authenticity and accreditation by Perinet manufacturing services.

Note: The general-purpose *periCORE Firmware Image* is intended for production scenarios only. Perinet advises against using this firmware image in end-customer applications.

The *periCORE Firmware Image* offers the following features for OEM manufacturing:

- Authentication of an authentic periCORE module, certified by Perinet (refer to Section 7.5).

- Deployment of Security Information, including X.509 certificates.
- Installation of the *OEM firmware image*.
- Network services access to all peripherals.
- Various networking capabilities, including IPv6, DNS-SD, MDNS, HTTP, TLS, MQTT, and more.

Note: Attestation information for the periCORE module is erased during the *OEM Production* process.

7.3.2 OEM Production State

The *OEM Production State* is the state in which a periCORE-based product is delivered. During the *OEM Production* process, the following key attributes are stored:

1. Authentication information specific to the product (details in Section 7.5).
2. The *OEM Firmware Image*.
3. Product-specific device information such as product name, host name, and serial number (see Section 9.2).
4. Configuration values unique to the product, like sensor calibration data.

Note: By default, no Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is active in this state, meaning all configurations and security settings are accessible and modifiable without client authentication. Implementing and activating RBAC is an additional step that must be taken.

7.3.3 Updated State

In the *Updated State*, a periCORE-based product operates using the *Update Firmware Image*. After a *Firmware Update* is successfully completed, the product will boot from the *Update Firmware Image* going forward.

To revert to the OEM Production State, a Factory Reset must be explicitly performed (details in Section 7.3.6).

Note: If a Firmware Update procedure fails, for instance due to a network disruption or corrupted Update Firmware Image, the periCORE-based product will transition to the *OEM Production State*.

7.3.4 Firmware Update

The Firmware Update process for a periCORE-based device can be initiated only when the device is in either the *OEM Production State* or the *Updated State*. Successful completion of this update will transition the device into the *Updated State*. The update is initiated through the RESTful API, which is detailed in Section 7.4. Notably, the update process is designed to be idempotent, meaning it can be safely repeated without changing the result beyond the initial application.

```
curl --data-binary '@<filename>' \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
-X PUT https://periNODE-sernm.local/update
```

Listing 1: An example Firmware Update deployment with the `curl` command line tool.

The RESTful API facilitates the exchange of the *Update Firmware Image* within the *Operational Storage Area* of the periCORE module (refer to Figure 19). It's important to note that this exchange does not immediately affect the firmware image currently in operation. This is true even when the Firmware Update is carried out from the *Updated State*.

To activate and run the new *Update Firmware Image*, a reboot of the periCORE module is required. This reboot can be triggered either through a power cycle or remotely via the RESTful API (details in Section 7.4).

```
curl -X PATCH https://periNODE-sernm.local/reboot
```

Listing 2: An example for triggering the reboot command with the `curl` command line tool.

During a Firmware Update, there are no alterations made to the data stored in the *Security Data* and *Config Data* segments of the periCORE module's persistent memory (as detailed in Figure 19). If a reset of these sections is required, it must be done manually. This can be accomplished through specific commands available via the RESTful API, further described in Section 7.4.

```
curl -X PATCH https://periNODE-sernm.local/config/reset
```

Listing 3: An example for configuration reset performed with the `curl` command line tool.

Note: If a Firmware Update process is unsuccessful, for instance, due to a network disruption or a corrupted Update Firmware Image, it will result in a change of the device's operational state. Following such a failure, the periCORE-based product will revert to the *OEM Production State*.

7.3.5 OEM Production

To transition a periCORE module to the *OEM Production State*, the following procedures should be completed:

1. Authenticate the periCORE module, as outlined in Section 7.5.
2. Install the product-specific *OEM Firmware Image*.
3. Implement device-specific *OEM Security Data*.
4. Input product-specific *OEM OTP Data*.
5. Reboot the device.

Note: These steps for the OEM Production process can only be executed from the *periCORE Production State*.

periCORE Authentication

Device attestation in the periCORE module occurs automatically with each RESTful API request, as detailed in Section 7.4. For information on explicit device authentication procedures, refer to Section 7.5.

Note: Product-specific authentication information is removed during the *OEM Production* process.

Deploy *OEM Firmware Image*

The process of deploying the *OEM Firmware Image* is carried out through a RESTful API call, as described in Section 7.4. This firmware image (detailed in Section 7.4.2) is uploaded using a *PUT* request. Below is an example demonstrating how to upload the *OEM Firmware Image*:

```
curl --data-binary "@<filename>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
-X PUT https://periCORE-sernm.local/production/oem-firmware
```

Listing 4: Deploying the *OEM Firmware Image* with the `curl` command line tool.

Note: Deploying the *OEM Firmware Image* invalidates the *OEM Security Data*, which encompasses the periCORE authentication information. As a result, a periCORE-based product will lose its ability to authenticate uniquely. Therefore, it is highly recommended to load appropriate *OEM Security Data* onto the device after completing this step.

Deploy *OEM Security Data*

```
curl -X PATCH --data-binary @perinode-host-cert-bundle.pem \
    https://periNODE-sernm.local/security/perinode-host-cert
```

Listing 5: Deploying the host certificate of the *OEM Security Data* with the `curl` command line tool.

```
curl -X PATCH --data-binary @root-ca-cert.crt \
    https://periNODE-sernm.local/security/perinet-root-ca-cert
```

Listing 6: Deploying the root CA certificate of the *OEM Security Data* with the `curl` command line tool.

Deploy *OEM OTP Data*

```
cat <<EOF | curl -X PATCH --data-binary @- https://periNODE-sernm.local/nodeInfo
{
    "hostname": "periNODE-sernm",
    "manufacturer": "Example Inc.",
    "product_charge": "1",
    "product_name": "periNODE example",
    "product_part_number": "MPN.0123.4567",
    "product_serial": "sernm",
    "product_version": "1"
}
EOF
```

Listing 7: Deploying the *OEM OTP DATA* with the `curl` command line tool.

7.3.6 Factory Reset

Performing a Factory Reset on a periCORE-based product clears the entire *Operational Storage Area*, returning the product to the *OEM Production State*. The reset process affects the following properties:

***Config Data* reset:** All persistent runtime configuration settings are reverted to their default firmware values. This includes network settings like `mqtt_broker_name` or `application_name`.

***Security Data* reset:** All security settings are reset to the default *OEM Security Data*. This disables mTLS and, consequently, client authentication (RBAC) as detailed in Section 7.6

***Update Firmware Image* invalidation:** The *Update Firmware Image* stored in the *Operational Storage Area* is invalidated. Upon the next boot, the periCORE-based product will run the *OEM Firmware Image*.

A *Factory Reset* can be initiated through the RESTful API (see Section 7.4), as demonstrated in the example below, or via a *Physical Factory Reset* (refer to Section 6).

```
curl -X PATCH https://periNODE-sernm.local/reset
```

Listing 8: Invoke a *Factory Reset* via the RESTful API.

Note: Any modifications made to the *Security Data* and *Config Data* will only become effective after the device is rebooted. Given that all security settings are reset to their defaults during a factory reset, it is strongly advised to reconfigure the security settings post-reset for optimal security.

7.3.7 Production Reset

The *Production Reset* process transitions the device back to the *periCORE Production State*, where it operates using the general-purpose *periCORE Firmware Image*. This reset option is accessible for 60 seconds during the first boot following a *Physical Factory Reset* (details in Section 7.3.6).

Initiating the *Production Reset* does not erase the *OEM Firmware Image* or the OEM Data (including *OEM Security Data* and *OEM OTP Data*). The process to activate the *Production Reset* via the RESTful API is illustrated in the following excerpt (for more information, see Section 7.4).

```
curl -X PATCH https://periNODE-sernm.local/production/reset
```

Listing 9: Invoke a *Production Reset* via the RESTful API.

Note: Performing the *Production Reset* will permanently invalidate both the *OEM Firmware Image* and the OEM Data (which includes *OEM Security Data* and *OEM OTP Data*). These changes will take effect after the periCORE-based product is rebooted.

7.4 RESTful API

A periCORE-based product features a RESTful [8] API for user access. To connect, use the hostname `periCORE-`*`sernm`*`.local`, where *`sernm`* is a unique identifier based on the product's serial number as explained in Section 9. The API provides various routes, which are listed in Table 16. These routes and their functions will be detailed in the subsequent subsections.

URL Resource	Description
/info	See Section 7.4.1
/config	
/config/reset	
/update	See Section 7.4.2
/reboot	
/reset	
/production/oem-firmware	
/production/reset	
/security	See Section 7.4.3
/security/host-cert	
/security/root-cert	
/security/client-cert	
/security/reset	

Table 16: RESTful API routes overview

7.4.1 Info Service

/info periCORE-based product information object (see Section 7.4.1).

`GET` expects empty body.

`200` Return `NodeInfo` object.

`204` Return empty body. No data is available.

`401` Unauthorized access, returns empty body

`500` Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/config periCORE-based product configuration object (see Section 7.4.1).

`GET` expects an empty body.

`200` Return `NodeConfig`.

`204` Return empty body. No data is available.

`401` Unauthorized access, returns empty body

`500` Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

PATCH expects a complete or partial `NodeConfig` object.

204 The Request has been accepted but was not processed yet. The object will be deserialized and merged. Given *keys* will be overwritten. The object will be stored persistently.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/config/reset periCORE-based product configuration object reset (see Section 7.4.1).

PATCH expects an empty body.

204 The Request has been accepted but was not processed yet. The default content of the object will be restored and the object will be stored persistently.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

Node Info

```
syntax="proto3";
package perinet.api;

message SwVersion {
  uint32 api = 1; // API compatibility incarnation
  uint32 build = 2; // build iteration
  uint32 version_number = 3; // firmware feature level incarnation
}

message NodeInfo {
    VersionInfo version_info = 1; // firmware version information
    string manufacturer = 2; // manufacturer identifier
    string hostname = 3; // host network identification name, e.g. periNODE-<id>.
    local periCORE-<id>.local
    string mac_address = 4; // unique mac address
    string product_charge = 5; // production batch identifier
    string product_part_number = 6; // product part identifier
    string product_serial = 7; // serial number of the product
    string product_name = 8; // calling name of the product
    string product_version = 9; // version of the product at production time
    string pericore_charge = 10; // batch identifier of the included periCORE
    string pericore_part_number = 11; // periCORE part identifier
    string pericore_serial = 12; // periCORE serial number
    string pericore_version = 13; // periCORE version identifier
}
```

Listing 10: periCORE *NodeInfo* object definition.

```
syntax="proto3";
package perinet.api;
option go_package = "perinet/api";

message NodeConfig {
    message Interface {
        google.protobuf.Any type = 1; //the type of interface, the particular
    interface has been configured to. Implementation specific.
        string element_name = 2; // element name of a particular interface, like a
    sensor source or an actuator sink.
        float period_seconds = 3; // in seconds, 0 means only event based (
    triggered) publishing
        uint32 samples_per_period = 4;  //defines how many values shall be sampled
    within a period,
                                        //the published value will be the rounded
    average
        // repeated Trigger trigger = 5;
    }
    string application_name = 1; // identification of the application the periCORE-
    based node is assigned to
    string mqtt_broker_name = 2; // URI of the MQTT broker, the periCORE-based node
     shall be connected to
    repeated Interface configs = 3;
}
```

Listing 11: periCORE *NodeConfig* object definition.

7.4.2 Life Cycle Service

/update periCORE-based product *Update Firmware Image* (see Section 7.4.2).

PUT expects octet-stream body.

204 Returns empty body. The Request has been received and is being processed.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

404 Resource is not available in this life state, e.g., for the *periCORE Production State*; see (Section 7.3).

/reboot Reboot the periCORE-based product.

PATCH expects an empty body.

204 Returns an empty body. The request is being processed and the device is performing a software reboot.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/reset periCORE-based product remote factory reset see (Section 7.3).

PATCH expects an empty body.

204 The Request has been accepted and is being processed. All persistent data is reset to its default state. (see Section 7.3).

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/production/oem-firmware periCORE-based product *OEM Firmware Image* (see Section 7.3).

PUT expects octet-stream body (see Section 7.4.2).

204 Returns empty body. The Request has been received and is being processed.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

404 Resource is not available in this life state, e.g., for the *OEM Production State*; (see Section 7.3).

/production/reset periCORE-based product *Production Reset* (see Section 7.3).

PATCH expects an empty body.

204 The Request has been accepted and is being processed. All persistent data is reset to its default state (see Section 7.3).

404 Resource is not available in this life state, returns empty body.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

Firmware Image

The Life Cycle Service of a periCORE-based product requires the *Firmware Image* to be in a signed binary format. For more comprehensive details on this format and related procedures, refer to the periCORE Firmware Development Application Note [10].

7.4.3 Security Service

/security/host-cert periCORE-based product host certificate object (see Section 7.6).

GET expects an empty body.

200 Return the host public certificate.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

PATCH expects a text/plain-encoded body containing the certificate.

204 The request has been accepted and processed. Returns empty body.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/security/root-cert periCORE-based product root certificate object (see Section 7.6).

GET expects an empty body.

200 Return the root public certificate.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

PATCH expects a text/plain-encoded body containing the root certificate.

204 The request has been accepted and processed. Returns empty body.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/security/client-cert periCORE-based product client certificate object (see Section 7.6).

GET expects an empty body.

200 Return the client public certificate.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

PATCH expects a text/plain-encoded body containing the certificate.

204 The request has been accepted and processed. Returns empty body.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/security/reset periCORE-based product security configuration reset object. (see Section 7.6)

PATCH expects an empty body.

204 Security configuration is reset to factory defaults: root and host certificates are replaced with the factory certificates, the client certificate is deleted, and the mTLS feature is disabled.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

/security periCORE-based product mTLS configuration object (see Section 7.6).

GET expects an empty body.

200 Returns a JSON-encoded object containing the key `enable_user_role` and its value.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

PATCH Expects a JSON-encoded object containing the key `enable_user_role` and its value.

204 The request has been accepted and processed. Returns empty body.

401 Unauthorized access, returns empty body.

500 Internal server error on unexpected error, returns empty body.

7.5 Device Attestation

The periCORE module, along with all products based on it, features a built-in authentication mechanism. This authentication occurs automatically during access to the RESTful API via HTTP (detailed in Section 7.4). The secure TLS protocol used for this access ensures that the X.509 certificate received during the connection is employed to authenticate the device.

For device authentication, the periCORE uses Perinet's Root CA certificate (*perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt* [11]), serving as the trust anchor.

7.6 Security

Certificate Type	Description
Root Certificate	Identifies the root CA trusted by periCORE. It authenticates remote clients before their connection to periCORE when mTLS is enabled.
Host Certificate	A unique certificate that the periCORE uses to authenticate itself during communications with a remote client via HTTP Server. It includes the hostname and is issued by a trusted root CA, verifying the device's authenticity.
Client Certificate	Enables the periCORE to authenticate itself as a client when connecting to remote servers. It is applicable in scenarios like connecting to an MQTT broker.

Table 17: Security Resources

Host and client certificates in the periCORE module are linked to their respective private keys. While using a GET method to retrieve these certificates does not reveal the private keys, updating them with a PATCH request requires the inclusion of the private key in the certificate file.

Below is an example showing a valid format of an *X.509 base64-encoded* certificate, which is concatenated with its private key:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICGjCCAb+gAwIBAgIRAMsuh27hf3EpZ5qTfkKDOpwwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwNjEa
MBgGA1UECgwRUEtJMmdvLW1pY2EtZ2t2bTkxGDAWBgNVBAMMD2V4YW1wbGUgUm9v
dCBDQTAeFw0yMjA3MjgxMjI3MzVaFw0yNDEwMzAxMjI3MzVaMDkxGjAYBgNVBAoM
EVBLSTJnby1taWNhLWdrdm05MRswGQYDVQQDDBJleGFtcGxlLWhvc3QubG9jYWww
WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQ13a55JkWRUGW2o30bU9Zqhw2e3gLn
wL0R6DOsyF118UlTSyYjLuziahGaXWtqcx3YvuetBkWNe5/oYxuAmRQRo4GqMIGn
MA4GA1UdDwEB/
    wQEAwIFoDAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMB
BggrBgEFBQcDAjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUO0UNscTx9QJG7JKks5gz+OCoDuQwHwYDVR0j
BBgwFoAUKLFmRdg8YvbYB5fNcBrsuJUh4h8wKwYDVR0RBCQwIoISZXhhbXBsZS1o
b3N0LmxvY2FsggxleGFtcGxlLWhvc3QwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhALqaMQpQ
E9h4voRoWtbLRweMpe82r+RlC4KB/RgIyrJvAiEArxjb08uoy4Q/pYn2CFrmh2T/
L95qNLuMNba9aE9n9EY=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS-----
BggqhkjOPQMBBw==
-----END EC PARAMETERS-----
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIMG1qiAmJAgpAOBq+mJkAtNlyJH6qhd3GCrOTiHeuv12oAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAENd2ueSZFkVBltqN9G1PWaocNnt4C58C9EegzrMhddfFJU0smIy7s
4moRml1ranMd2L7nrQZFjXuf6GMbgJkUEQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
```

The example below demonstrates how to update the *host certificate* using the `curl` command line tool. This method is also applicable for updating the root and client certificates. To do so, simply adjust the URL and the file in the command as needed:

```
curl --data-binary @<certificate-file> \
 -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
 -X PATCH https://periCORE-sernm.local/security/host-cert
# reboot device
curl -X PATCH https://periCORE-sernm.local/reboot
```

Note: Access to the periCORE module requires the use of TLS security, which is always enabled. Clients, such as web browsers or command line tools like `curl`, can bypass the server's (periCORE's) CA check if necessary. While this approach maintains encrypted connections, it's useful in scenarios where the user can guarantee trust, like when periCORE is the only device on the network. The base URL for accessing periCORE always follows this format: `https://periCORE-sernm.local/`.

The *root certificate* refers to the public certificate of a trusted authority, usually the Perinet ECC Root CA by default. It is provided as a single X.509 base64-encoded certificate, excluding the private key.

A periCORE module can be configured to enable *mTLS* along with *Role Based Access Control (RBAC)*. When mTLS is activated, a remote client must authenticate itself using a client certificate before establishing a connection. This certificate is verified against the stored root certificate and is expected to be signed by it. Additionally, the client certificate specifies a user role, determining the level of access.

The periCORE supports the following user roles:

***admin*:** Grants full read/write access without any restrictions.

***super*:** Allows reading and writing to all resources except */security* and */update*.

***reader*:** Provides read-only access, with no write permissions.

Activating *mTLS/RBAC* on the periCORE's HTTP server requires careful management of valid certificates. Without properly deployed certificates, or if a client fails to provide the correct signed certificate, the HTTP server may become inaccessible. Any connection attempts with an invalid client certificate typically result in a **401 Unauthorized** error response.

To check the status of *mTLS/RBAC*, you can use the `/security` resource. This resource provides a JSON-encoded object with the parameter `enable_user_role`, indicating whether mTLS/RBAC is enabled. An example of how to retrieve this information is provided below:

```
curl -X GET https://periCORE-sernm.local/security
# default response: {"enable_user_role":false}
```

To activate mTLS/RBAC on the periCORE using the RESTful API, you can follow the command example provided below:

```
curl --data='{"enable_user_role":true}' \
  -X PATCH https://periCORE-sernm.local/security
# reboot device
curl -X PATCH https://periCORE-sernm.local/reboot
```

To reset the security configuration on the periCORE, refer to the command example provided below:

```
curl -X PATCH https://periCORE-sernm.local/security/reset
```

When the periCORE becomes inaccessible, for instance, due to a lost *client certificate*, refer to the factory reset procedure in Section 6 for resolution.

Note that changes to the security configuration are persistent. However, they only take effect after rebooting the device. Rebooting can be accomplished through the RESTful API, as detailed in Section 7.4, or by performing a power cycle.

7.6.1 Deployment of Client Certificates for periCORE

The periCORE's RBAC system utilizes the capability to embed strings in X.509 certificate version 3 using arbitrary extensions, as detailed in [20]. These extensions are crucial for periCORE to determine the `Role` assigned to each certificate, which in turn controls access to various operations.

Listing 12 showcases the configuration for these extensions. This configuration can be included in the CA configuration file used during the signing of the certificate sign request (CSR).

Below is the configuration for the three supported extensions. This configuration can be incorporated into the CA configuration file and applied when signing new certificates.

```
[ reader_user_ext ]
keyUsage                = critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
basicConstraints        = CA:false
extendedKeyUsage        = clientAuth
1.2.3.001               = ASN1:UTF8String:reader_user

[ super_user_ext ]
keyUsage                = critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
basicConstraints        = CA:false
extendedKeyUsage        = clientAuth
1.2.3.011               = ASN1:UTF8String:super_user

[ admin_user_ext ]
keyUsage                = critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
basicConstraints        = CA:false
extendedKeyUsage        = clientAuth
1.2.3.111               = ASN1:UTF8String:admin_user
```

Listing 12: Configuration of extension for RBAC

To effectively deploy client certificates with these arbitrary extensions, it is recommended to use the *-extension* parameter in conjunction with the desired extension tag: *reader_user_ext*, *super_user_ext*, or *admin_user_ext*. The example command below demonstrates how to use the *admin_user_ext* extension tag with `openssl`:

```
openssl ca -config ca-config-file -in csr-file -out crt-file -extensions
admin_user_ext
```

Listing 13: Example openssl command to sign and include admin_user extension

Once properly configured, the client certificate will be parsed as demonstrated in the example below:

```
    Certificate:
    Data:
      Version: 3 (0x2)
      Serial Number:
        cb:2e:87:6e:e1:7f:71:29:67:9a:93:7e:42:83:3a:9a
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
      Issuer: O=PKI2go-mica-gkvm9, CN=example Root CA
      Validity
        Not Before: Jul 28 12:06:20 2022 GMT
        Not After : Oct 30 12:06:20 2024 GMT
      Subject: O=PKI2go-mica-gkvm9, CN=admin_pki_container
      Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
          Public-Key: (256 bit)
          pub:
            04:7f:75:56:6d:33:6c:d5:70:a4:f9:64:3a:96:47:
            b6:10:30:91:ad:12:c8:bc:03:94:a6:5f:29:6e:f3:
            18:6b:2f:23:03:cf:3b:79:05:be:77:74:ba:16:33:
            1e:a0:0b:c3:e5:07:03:a3:74:b4:f1:b1:db:d7:cd:
            ea:61:e9:b7:cb
          ASN1 OID: prime256v1
          NIST CURVE: P-256
      X509v3 extensions:
        X509v3 Key Usage: critical
          Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
        X509v3 Basic Constraints:
          CA:FALSE
        X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
          TLS Web Client Authentication
        1.2.3.111:
          .
  admin_user
    Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
       30:45:02:21:00:cc:08:15:e7:02:49:02:8e:88:af:ad:19:0e:
       a9:51:5c:f6:9c:64:6d:7a:aa:96:82:07:75:8b:da:f0:7b:5e:
       b6:02:20:29:7c:13:67:92:f0:41:cf:63:e7:71:2c:df:fd:1a:
       94:32:88:42:d1:17:88:85:78:cd:f0:5b:66:81:c3:e8:c6
```

Listing 14: Example Client Certificate Parsed

Table 18 provides a summary of the custom OIDs and their respective tags in ASN.1 format.

user	Custom OID	ASN.1 String Format
admin	1.2.3.111	UTF8String:admin_user
super	1.2.3.011	UTF8String:super_user
reader	1.2.3.001	UTF8String:reader_user

Table 18: ASN1 for RBAC certificate extension

7.7 *libperiCORE* Software Library



Figure 21: Overview of the *libperiCORE* structure.

7.8 Web User Interface

As illustrated in Figure 19, both the *OEM Storage Area* and the *Operational Storage Area* of the periCORE module include space allocated for a web user interface (WebUI).

When the periCORE-based product is in *OEM Production State* or *Updated State* (referring to Figure 20), the WebUI can be accessed through the firmware's integrated web server via the URL `https://periCORE-sernm.local` (refer to Section 9.2 for information on the generation of *sernm*).

The *periCORE SDK* includes an exemplary and customizable WebUI template. When compiling the firmware with the *update_image* target, the resulting binary will contain the WebUI. During

the compilation, all `.css`, `.js`, and `.html` files are minified, and `.png` files are optimized.

Note: It is advisable to maintain low file sizes for the *WebUI Data*-segments, considering a maximum limit of 256kB.

Updating the firmware with the newly compiled binary via the RESTful API (refer to Section 7.3.4) writes the *WebUI Data*-segment into either the *OEM Storage Area* or the *Operational Storage Area*. A reboot is required for the firmware update to take effect and for the WebUI to become available.

Given the necessity for client systems to support DNS-SD or mDNS, currently recommended web browsers for accessing the `.local`-URL are:

- Microsoft Edge
- Safari

7.8.1 WebUI Template

The periCORE SDK includes an expandable template for a single-page web application. This template is designed primarily to facilitate the reading and writing of data via the periCORE's RESTful API (detailed in Section 7.4) through a modern and secure web interface.

This section outlines the structure of the WebUI template and provides guidance on how to customize it according to specific needs.

The template, by default, contains the following pages, each serving a distinct purpose:

Page	Intended Purpose
Home	Dashboard providing display elements for *sensors* and control elements for *actuators*.
Information	A view for periCORE-based product information (refer to Section 7.4.1).
Configuration	Inputs for configuring periCORE-based products (see Section 7.4.1).
Security	Inputs for configuring periCORE-based security settings (refer to Section 7.4.3).
Firmware Update	Interface for uploading a new firmware image.
API documentation	Option to download the API documentation as an `api.proto`-file.
Online documentation	Link to the comprehensive online documentation.

Table 19: WebUI pages and their intended purpose.

Example: Changing the Corporate Identity

Figure 22 displays a mock-up image of the website's layout, featuring a header and footer but excluding content.



Figure 22: WebUI's corporate identity

In this scenario, alterations to the logo and footer information are required to reflect a change in corporate identity. To implement these modifications, the file `webui/fs_periCORE_product/js/peri_base.js` should be edited.

Figure 23 illustrates the periCORE SDK interface. It displays the structure of WebUI-related files in the directory tree on the left side, with the specific source file `peri_base.js` opened for editing.



Figure 23: Source code for the WebUI's corporate identity in the periCORE SDK

To update the logo, access the *dom_header()* function (shown at line 112 in the figure). Here, the `src` attribute of the HTML image element is set to `images/perinet-logo.png` by default.

For modifying the footer's content, look into the *dom_footer()* function (line 129 in the figure) and adjust the HTML paragraphs as needed.

Example: Adding Information to the *Home* Page

The type of sensor or actuator, along with the implementation of the application-specific sample and config objects (see Section 7.4.1), dictates the selection of HTML elements. These elements can be chosen to best represent sensor values or display actuator status interactively.

Figure 24 presents the *Home* page of a periCORE-based product with actuator peripherals. In this example, the peripherals are two GPIO ports. *GPIO 1* is set as an output (actuator), and *GPIO 2* as an input (sensor). The goal is to provide an HTML input element to control the output *GPIO 1*. For the input *GPIO 2*, the same HTML input element is disabled for the time being.



Figure 24: WebUI *Home* page for an actuator

The content of the *Home* page is sourced from the file `webui/fs_periCORE_product/js_node/home.js`.

Figure 25 displays the periCORE SDK interface with the aforementioned source file open for editing.

Figure 25: Source code for the WebUI's *Home* page in the periCORE SDK.

The HTML content for the *Home* page is defined in the *dom_home()* function, and subsequent functions manage its dynamic updates.

Pre-existing functions are designed to reflect the live status of sensors or actuators on the user interface. For instance, the *evaluate_sample()* function continuously retrieves the JSON-formatted response from the RESTful API's sample object for processing and display.

Similarly, *evaluate_config()* continuously fetches the JSON response from the RESTful API's configuration object (refer to Section 7.4.1).

The interval for these requests is set to 1 second in the *reload_home()* function (not shown in the figure).

The handling of actuator elements is customizable. For instance, the *switch_if_1()* function (not shown in the figure), linked to a click event on the *GPIO 1* input element, sends a patch request to the RESTful API's configuration object (see Section 7.4.1). This request toggles the state of the output port.

Feedback about the success of this operation would be implemented through the mentioned

`evaluate_sample()` function (visible in Figure 25), that updates the input element (e.g. change its text from ”off” to ”on”).

8 Product Handling

The periCORE module is delivered in Tape and Reel with *500*pcs reel.

8.1 Reel Information

A reel of type A is used.



Figure 26: The dimensions of the Reel, used to deliver the periCORE modules.

Dimension	Value
A	330.00 mm
B	2.00 mm
C	12.82 mm
D	25.52 mm
N	100.00 mm
W1	30.00 mm
W2	36.00 mm
W3	30.00 mm

Table 20: Dimension of the reel.

8.2 Tape Information



Figure 27: Tape and Reel packaging specification for the periCORE module.

8.3 Moisture Sensitivity Levels

The periCORE modules are rated at moisture sensitivity level 3 (MSL3). The reel dry bag is labelled with a moisture sensitive warning label with detailed information. With opening of the dry bag, the periCORE modules must be mounted within 168 hours while staying surrounded in factory conditions of maximum 30°C/60%RH.

During a potential storing, e.g. when the modules cannot be mounted within 168 hours after opening the dry bag, the storage condition must not exceed 10%RH.

The periCORE modules require baking/tempering if the humidity indicator card shows more than 10% when read at +23±5°C or if the conditions mentioned above are not met. Please refer to JEDEC J-STD-033B standards for more details about the bake procedure.

8.4 Pick and Place

The module is suitable for pick and place assembly machines. The surface area of the information adhesive on the main IC on top of the modules offers a good interface to vacuum driven pick up nozzles.

8.5 Soldering

The periCORE is a surface mount module, produced on a 6-layer FR4 printed circuit board (PCB). It has gold plated pads and is suitable for a reflow soldering process with a lead-free soldering paste. For host boards with the periCORE module, only a single reflow soldering process is permitted.

The reflow profile to be used with the periCORE module depends on the thermal mass of the entire populated host PCB, the efficiency of the heat transfer of the reflow oven, and the characteristics of the used solder paste. For this reason, the optimum reflow profile should be defined for every design individually. The information given here is based on the IPC/JEDEC J-STD-020E standard.

The recommended reflow profile of the periCORE module is shown in Figure 28 and the values of the parameters are given in Table 21. The reflow profile is for the soldering process based on RoHS/Pb-free (Sn96.5/Ag3.0/Cu0.5) solder paste.



Figure 28: Recommended reflow profile

Symbol	Parameter	Value
-	Max Ramp up rate (T_L to T_P)	3 °C/s
T_{SMIN}	Minimum soak temperature	150 °C
T_{SMAX}	Maximum soak temperature	200 °C
t_S	Soak time	60 - 180 sec
T_L	Liquidus temperature	217 °C
t_L	Time above T_L	60 - 150 sec
T_P	Peak temperature	235 - 245 °C
t_P	Time within +0 / -5 °C of actual T_P	30 sec
-	Max Ramp down rate (T_P to T_L)	6 °C/s
-	Max Time from +25 °C to T_P	3 min

Table 21: Recommended reflow profile parameter values.

8.6 ESD Handling Precautions

The periCORE module has limited built-in ESD (electro-static discharge) protection. Therefore, it is advised to always take reasonable precautions:

- Use a well-grounded anti-static wrist strap when handling the module.
- Place the module only on anti-static surfaces.
- Touch the module only at its edges or at the (non-conductive) marking adhesive on the main IC. Never touch the pads or other components on the module.
- The module must not come into contact with fabrics, including clothing.

Note: Failure to follow accepted ESD handling practices may damage the module. The warranty may be voided if the module is damaged by ESD.

9 Product Marking

9.1 Optical Product Marking

The periCORE module is marked with a two-dimensional Data Matrix code according to ISO/IEC 16022 [1]. An example is shown in Figure 29.



Figure 29: Visual marking via data matrix code of the periCORE module.

The sticker on the central IC shows the data matrix code and the 12-digit alphanumeric serial number. The information in the data matrix code is listed below:

- `pericore_serial`
- `pericore_part_number`
- `pericore_version`
- `pericore_charge`

```
762EDB023D8B\n
PRN000001\n
pC 4.1\n
2022-08
```

Listing 15: The example content of the data matrix code for a periCORE module.

9.2 Electronic Product Marking

Via the network interface, product identification parameters can be read via the RESTful API (see Section 7.4.1):

```
{
  ”hostname”: ”periCORE-sernm”,
  ”mac_address”: ”76:2E:DB:02:3D:8B”,
  ”manufacturer”: ”Perinet GmbH”,
  ”pericore_charge”: ”1”,
  ”pericore_part_number”: ”PRN.000.001”,
  ”pericore_serial”: ”762EDB023D8B”,
  ”pericore_version”: ”5”,
  ”product_charge”: ””,
  ”product_name”: ””,
  ”product_part_number”: ””,
  ”product_serial”: ””,
  ”product_version”: ””,
  ”version_info”: {
    ”firmware_variant”: ”periCORE”,
    ”firmware_version”: {
      ”api”: 12,
      ”build”: 52,
      ”version_number”: 14
    }
  }
}
```


Listing 16: The periCORE NodeInfo object received via the resource /info.

Note: The above listed parameters are provided as an example and do variate for different periCORE modules.

9.3 Unique Serial Number

A periCORE module is identified by a 12-digit unique serial number. The globally unique serial number is deployed to each periCORE module during the production. It is available on the periCORE module as part of the optical marking (see Section 9.1) as well as part of the electronic marking (see Section 9.2).

9.4 Unique Hostname

During the production, a periCORE module is configured with a unique *hostname*. The hostname is generated out of two parts, the static *prefix* and a dynamically generated *suffix*. During *OEM Production* the hostname can be overwritten via the RESTful API (see Section 7.3.5 and Section 7.4).

periCORE-sernm.local the *prefix* part is set to *periCORE* for all periCORE modules.

periCORE-sernm.local the 5-digit alphanumeric *suffix* was generated from a unique serial number (see Section 9.3) by using a Base32 conversion algorithm, which is described in Table 22.

Step	Instruction	Example
1	Take the *last 6 digits* of the serial number	Serial number `762EDB023D8B` ⇒ **`023D8B`**
2	Convert them to binary	`023D8B`$_{(16)}$ ⇒ **`0000 0010 0011 1101 1000 1011`**$_{(2)}$
3	Enqueue a 0 to the most significant position, if the serial number starts with `742EDB`. Enqueue an 1 otherwise.	`0000 0010 0011 1101 1000 1011` ⇒ **`1 0000 0010 0011 1101 1000 1011`**
4	Order the sequence into sets of 5	`1 0000 0010 0011 1101 1000 1011` ⇒ **`10000 00100 01111 01100 01011`**
5	Convert each set using the character definition from Table 23	`10000 00100 01111 01100 01011` ⇒ **`s e r n m`**

Table 22: Algorithm to generate the hostname *suffix* from the serial number

A unique part of the hostname is generated with the conversion of the serial number to a Base32 encoded alphanumeric representation. The Base32 encoded representation was selected to discard ambiguous characters.

$Value_2$	00000	00001	00010	00011	00100	00101	00110	00111	01000	01001	01010	01011	01100	01101	01110	01111	10000	10001	10010	10011	10100	10101	10110	10111	11000	11001	11010	11011	11100	11101	11110	11111
$Value_{10}$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
$Value_{32}$	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	m	n	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Table 23: The Base32 conversion table to generate the hostname *suffix*.

A periCORE-based product supports the mDNS based name resolution protocol. The libperiCORE (see Section 7) implements an mDNS responder. Therefore, the hostname of a periCORE-based product can be resolved via the mDNS protocol with its link local FQDN, e.g. the `periCORE-sernm.local` resolves to the following Link Local Address (IPv6 LLA):

`fe80:0000:0000:0000:762e:db02:3d8b:0000`

9.5 Unique IPv6 Link Local Address

The periCORE's IPv6 Link Local Address (IPv6 LLA) is formed from the serial number, that can be retrieved from the optical (see Section 9.1) or electronic (see Section 9.2) product marking. It is therefore MAC-address based as well (see Section 9.6) and is composed as follows:

`fe80:0000:0000:0000:`*`xxxx:xxxx:xxxx`*`:0000`

where each *x* represents one digit of the serial number following its ordering, e.g. `fe80::762e:db02:3d8b:0000` represents the IPv6 LLA for the serial number `762EDB023D8B`.

9.6 MAC Address

The periCORE's MAC-address is based on the serial number, that can be retrieved from the optical (see Section 9.1) or electronic (see Section 9.2) product marking. It is composed as shown in the following excerpt:

xx:*xx*:*xx*:*xx*:*xx*:*xx*

where each *x* represents one of the digits of the serial number in order, e.g. `76:2E:DB:02:3D:8B` represents the MAC-address for the serial number `762EDB023D8B`.

10 Ordering Information

Ordering Code	Product Name	Description
PRN.000.001	periCORE	periCORE single pair ethernet communication module.
PRN.000.019	periCORE Development Board	Minimal firmware development setup.
PRN.000.020	periCORE Development Kit	Full featured firmware development setup.

11 Contact & Support

For customer support, please call us at **+49 30 863 206 701** or send an e-mail to *support@perinet.io*.

For complete contact information visit us at www.perinet.io

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D Glossary

100BASE-T1 A Ethernet Standard where two endpoints are connected by a single twisted pair cable. It is one of the so-called Single Pair Ethernet (SPE) standards. It operates in full-duplex with a data rate of 100 MBit per second. Furthermore, it uses PAM-3 modulation with a voltage level from -1 to +1V, differentially on the two wires. 7, 8

100BASE-TX A Ethernet Standard where two twisted pairs with differential signals are used, one for each direction. The data rate is 100 MBit per second. It is also called ”Fast Ethernet”. 7, 8, 10

API Application Programming Interface. 43, 63, 64

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BSC Basic Spacing Between Centers. 18, 19

CA Certification Authority, a trusted entity which is represented by a certificate that is used to verify the signature on a certificate issued by that authority (trust anchor). 48, 49, 82

CSMA/CD Carrier-sense multiple access with collision detection. 10

CSR Certificate Sign Request. 51

DNS-SD DNS Service Discovery [3] is a way of using standard DNS programming interfaces, servers and packet formats to browse the network for services. 6, 37, 54

ESD Electro Static Discharge. 4, 62

FIFO First In First Out, where the first in is the first out. For resource management, like for the scheduling of tasks it is also known as a first-come, first-served (FCFS) and specifies the order of the execution of a task in regard to his occurrence over time. 35

FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name, sometimes also referred to as an absolute domain name, is a domain name that specifies its exact location in the tree hierarchy of the Domain Name System (DNS). 65

GPIO General-Purpose Input/Output. 7, 16

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol is an application-layer protocol for transmitting hypermedia documents, such as HTML. 37, 48

I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit is a synchronous, multi-master, multi-slave, packet switched, single-ended, serial bus. 7

IC Integrated Circuit. 1, 60, 62, 63

idempotent Idempotence is the property of certain operations in mathematics and computer science whereby they can be applied multiple times without changing the result beyond the initial state. 38

IIoT Industrial Internet of Things. 1, 7

IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6 [7], a communication protocol. 37, 79

IPv6 LLA Internet Protocol Version 6 [7] link-local unicast address. 65, 66, 79

MAC Media Access Controller, component that handles concurrent access to a shared physical communication medium. 10, 36, 65, 66

MDI Media Dependent Interface, a Fast-Ethernet chipset component. 26

mDNS multicast Domain Name Service [4], a protocol that implements a local distributed name resolving mechanism. 6, 37, 54, 65, 79

MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport is a lightweight, publish-subscribe based network protocol that transports messages between devices. 37

mTLS Mutual TLS extends the TLS protocol by requiring clients to pass certificates, allowing to provide authorization mechanisms of Application services. 31, 32, 40, 47, 48, 50

NTP Network Time Protocol. 82

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer is generally perceived as a company that produces parts and equipment that may be marketed by another manufacturer. 32, 33, 35–37

OID Object Identifier. 52

OS Operating System, a system software that manages computer hardware and software resources. 33–35

OTP One-Time Programmable memory. 35

PCB Printed Circuit Board. 61

PHY Physical layer. Lowest layer of the OSI model. 8

RBAC Role Based Access Control. 32, 37, 40, 50–52, 71

RTC Real-Time Clock, a battery-backed timekeeping device that retains the current time across power cycles. 82

SPE Single Pair Ethernet. 7

SPI The Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) is a synchronous serial communication interface specification used for inter IC communication. 15, 22, 23

TLS Transport Layer Security Protocol. Used by Application Protocols like MQTT or HTTP to allow secure data transfer. 37, 48, 49, 78, 81

UART A Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter is a computer hardware device for asynchronous serial communication. 7

X.509 X.509 is an International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard defining the format of public key certificates. 37, 48

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G Errata

Known Issues and their resolutions are discussed in this section.

G.1 E-2024-006: legacy TLS-Renegotiation flag

Erratum Date: 2024-07-06

Affected Products:	periCORE	periNODE 0-10V	periNODE GPIO	periSWITCH 3port	periSTART standard
Product Number:	PRN.000.001	PRN.000.002	PRN.000.010	PRN.000.008	PRN.000.003
Production Date:	2021-01 to current				
Firmware Version:	all before and including version *20*				

Table 24: E-2024-006: Affected Products

G.1.1 Issue Description

Per [6], a man-in-the-middle attack is possible during the TLS handshake when legacy renegotiation is enabled.

Symptoms

While the vulnerability by itself is not detectable, recent tools, such as `curl` from v8.0.0 onward, fail with an error code (Listing 17) to protect its users against this potential vulnerability.

```
curl: (35) OpenSSL/3.0.13: error:0A000152:SSL routines::unsafe legacy renegotiation
    disabled
```

Listing 17: Example of potential observed error message.

Impact

Access to the periCORE during production may not work as documented, because it depends on third-party tools. *Note: no impact in the field while using updated firmware versions.*

G.1.2 Solution

The vulnerability has been removed from the dependent library `libperiCORE`. Use the workaround (Section G.1.3) during the production of periCORE-based products.

Note: OEM products must use *libperiCORE* version 23 or higher.

G.1.3 Workaround

Using old binaries

To access the periCORE production firmware, use an old statically linked curl version, e.g. `curl-7.88.1`[7].

Note: Statically linked binaries do not use the system-deployed glibc; therefore, mDNS-based name resolution may not work.

Since the statically linked curl binaries might not be able to resolve the hostname via mDNS, the usage of the IPv6 link-local address (IPv6 LLA) is therefore necessary, as shown in the following excerpt.

```
ADDRESS=$(getent ahosts periCORE-sernm.local | awk '/STREAM/ {print $1}')
test -n "$ADDRESS" && ./curl-7.88.1 -X GET https://[$ADDRESS]/info --insecure ||
    echo "address not found"
```

Listing 18: Example command to access the periCORE of serial number `sernm` with an old statically linked binary.

Override Default Configuration

The following excerpt (Listing 19) defines an override of the default configuration of the command line tool `curl`.

[7] https://gitlab.com/perinet/product-release-artifacts/-/tree/main/misc/curl-static-7.88.1

```
openssl_conf = openssl_init

[openssl_init]
ssl_conf = ssl_sect
providers = provider_sect

[ssl_sect]
system_default = system_default_sect

[provider_sect]
default = default_sect
legacy = legacy_sect

[default_sect]
activate = 1

[legacy_sect]
activate = 1

[system_default_sect]
Options = UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation
```

Listing 19: Example openSSL configuration file, which ignores legacy renegotiation restrictions.

Store the content of above excerpt (Listing 19) in a file, for instance `~/openssl-reneg.conf`. The overridden configuration file needs to be announced in the environment, as shown in the following excerpt Listing 20.

```
export OPENSSL_CONF=~/openssl-reneg.conf
```

Listing 20: Override default openSSL configuration to accept legacy renegotiation.

Note: It is **not recommended, to update the global openSSL configuration file for this workaround**

G.2 E-2025-001: periCORE TLS certificate validation

Erratum Date: 2025-04-21

Affected Products:	periCORE	periNODE 0-10V	periNODE GPIO	periSWITCH 3port	periSTART standard
Product Number:	PRN.000.001	PRN.000.002	PRN.000.010	PRN.000.008	PRN.000.002
Production Date:	2021-01 to current				
Firmware Version:	all versions				

Table 25: E-2025-001: Affected Products

G.2.1 Issue Description

Validating the TLS certificate of a periCORE-based product requires both legacy renegotiation support (see Section G.1) and the ability to verify the certificate independently of its validity period (`-no_check_time`). Standard OpenSSL 3.x builds no longer expose the `UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation` option through configuration, and recent `curl` versions (v8.0.0+) refuse connections to endpoints that use legacy renegotiation.

Symptoms

Certificate validation fails with either the legacy renegotiation error described in Section G.1, or with a certificate verification error when the device certificate has expired relative to the current system time.

On Windows, the `curl` binary shipped with the operating system uses the Schannel TLS backend rather than OpenSSL. Schannel reports the validity-period failure for the chain as a whole and does not identify which chain element is affected (Listing 21).

```
* schannel: added 1 certificate(s) from CA file
  'perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt'
* schannel: this certificate or one of the certificates in the
  certificate chain is not time valid
* closing connection #0
curl: (60) schannel: this certificate or one of the certificates
  in the certificate chain is not time valid
```

Listing 21: Schannel error reported by the Windows-supplied `curl`.

Note: `curl` provides no option to disable the validity-period check alone, with neither the Schannel nor the OpenSSL backend. The only available option is `--insecure` / `-k`, which disables certificate verification entirely and therefore defeats the purpose of the check. Use `openssl` with `-no_check_time` instead, as described in Section G.2.3.

Possible causes of a time-invalid chain

The Perinet ECC Root CA is valid until 2050 (Table 26) and is therefore not the cause. A validity-period failure originates either in the host certificate of the device or in the intermediate production batch CA. The following causes have not been confirmed and are listed as candidates for diagnosis:

1. The device may have no valid time source (neither RTC nor NTP) and may fall back to a default or production date. The host certificate would then lie outside the validity window expected by a client whose system time is correct.
2. The production batch CA of an older manufacturing batch may have expired.
3. The system time of the client PC may be set incorrectly.

Impact

TLS certificate validation of periCORE-based products during production and field verification requires dedicated tooling. Standard system-provided `openssl` and `curl` binaries on modern operating systems cannot perform the validation without workarounds.

G.2.2 Solution

Use the statically linked `curl~7.88.1` and `openssl~1.1.1w` binaries[8]. These binaries are cross-compiled against OpenSSL 1.1.1w, which retains legacy renegotiation support and supports the `-no_check_time` option. A pre-built Windows x64 archive is available for direct download[9].

The produced binaries import only standard system libraries (`KERNEL32`, `ADVAPI32`, `CRYPT32`, `BCRYPT`, `USER32`, `WS2_32`, `MSVCRT` on Windows; glibc on Linux) and run standalone without additional runtime dependencies.

G.2.3 Workaround

Verify the certificate with `-no_check_time`, which disables the validity-period check while leaving the signature chain check intact. This is the relevant check for an authenticity assessment: the origin of a device is established by the signature chain up to the Perinet root CA, not by the validity period of a certificate. An expired certificate is therefore not evidence of a counterfeit device.

Reference values of the Perinet ECC Root CA

Download the root CA (*perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt* [11]) and compare it against Table 26 before using it as a trust anchor.

[8] https://gitlab.com/perinet/product-release-artifacts/-/tree/main/misc/curl-static-7.88.1
[9] https://downloads.perinet.io/misc/curl-static-7.88.1/curl-7.88.1-openssl-1.1.1w-win64.zip

Field	Value
subject	`C=DE, O=Perinet GmbH, CN=Perinet ECC Root CA`
notBefore	`Jan 6 15:10:02 2021 GMT`
notAfter	`Dec 30 15:10:02 2050 GMT`
SHA256	`2F:F1:B3:0A:49:0B:B6:48:09:77:CD:6B:A1:60:4D:2E:` `12:2A:9F:C5:AE:4D:13:3C:93:89:10:80:26:C4:A6:E0`

Table 26: E-2025-001: Perinet ECC Root CA reference values

Note: The fingerprint can be printed with `openssl x509 -in perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt -noout -subject -dates -fingerprint -sha256`. The values above were confirmed on 2026-08-21.

Linux

Create a minimal OpenSSL configuration that enables legacy renegotiation, then use `openssl s_client` with `-no_check_time` (Listing 22).

```
OPENSSL_CONF=<(echo -e "\
openssl_conf = default_conf\n\
[default_conf]\n\
ssl_conf = ssl_sect\n\
[ssl_sect]\n\
system_default = system_default_sect\n\
[system_default_sect]\n\
Options = UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation") \
  openssl s_client \
    -connect periCORE-<serial>.local:443 \
    -CAfile ~/perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt \
    -no_check_time
```

Listing 22: Certificate validation on Linux using process substitution. Replace `<serial>` with the periCORE serial number.

Windows (PowerShell)

On Windows, process substitution is not available. Write the OpenSSL configuration to a file instead (Listing 23).

```
@"
openssl_conf = default_conf
[default_conf]
ssl_conf = ssl_sect
[ssl_sect]
system_default = system_default_sect
[system_default_sect]
Options = UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation
"@ | Set-Content -Encoding ascii openssl.cnf

$env:OPENSSL_CONF = "$PWD\openssl.cnf"

.\openssl-1.1.1w.exe s_client `
  -connect periCORE-<serial>.local:443 `
  -CAfile perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt `
  -no_check_time
```

Listing 23: Certificate validation on Windows using PowerShell. Replace `<serial>` with the periCORE serial number.

Note: `-no_check_time` requires OpenSSL 1.1.0 (released 2016-08-25) or later; it is not available in 1.0.2 or earlier. The statically linked `openssl~1.1.1w` binary referenced above supports it, as do the `verify`, `s_client` and `s_server` subcommands.

Identifying the time-invalid chain element

Because Schannel does not name the affected chain element, the chain has to be retrieved and inspected element by element. Split the chain into individual files (Listing 24), verify the signature chain without the validity-period check (Listing 25), then print the validity period of every element (Listing 26).

```
"Q" | .\openssl-1.1.1w.exe s_client `
        -connect periCORE-<serial>.local:443 `
        -showcerts 2>&1 | Out-File -Encoding ascii chain.txt

$pem = '(?s)-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' +
       '.*?-----END CERTIFICATE-----'
$m = [regex]::Matches((Get-Content chain.txt -Raw), $pem)

for ($i=0; $i -lt $m.Count; $i++) {
  $m[$i].Value | Set-Content -Encoding ascii "cert$i.pem"
}

$inter = 1..($m.Count-1) | % { "cert$_.pem" }
Get-Content $inter | Set-Content -Encoding ascii intermediates.pem
```

Listing 24: Splitting the device certificate chain into individual files.

`cert0.pem` holds the host certificate of the device; `intermediates.pem` holds the remaining chain elements.

```
.\openssl-1.1.1w.exe verify -no_check_time `
  -CAfile perinet-ecc-root-ca.crt `
  -untrusted intermediates.pem cert0.pem
```

Listing 25: Verifying the signature chain; expected result `cert0.pem: OK`.

```
0..($m.Count-1) | % {
  .\openssl-1.1.1w.exe x509 -in "cert$_.pem" `
    -noout -subject -issuer -dates
}
```

Listing 26: Printing subject, issuer and validity period of each chain element.

The subject `CN` of `cert0` must match the host name of the device. The chain element whose `notAfter` date lies in the past is the cause of the failure reported by Schannel.

Note: If the device transmits only its host certificate, `intermediates.pem` is empty and `verify` fails with `unable to get local issuer certificate` instead of a validity-period error. That is a separate condition and not covered by this erratum.

Note: Disabling the validity-period check does not weaken the authenticity assessment, but it does not prove possession of the private key either. Certificates are public data and can be copied; proof of possession is established only by a fully verified TLS handshake. Do not substitute `--insecure` or `-k` for `-no_check_time`: those options disable certificate verification entirely and yield no statement about authenticity at all. Where Section G.1 uses `--insecure`, it does so to reach the device at all, not to assess its authenticity.

H Revision History

Revision	Date	Author(s)	Description
1	2022-06-08	msen, dper, shoe, kwal, tkla, psil	Initial Release
2	2022-07-22	shoe, psil, kwal, nsav	Update cover picture, Add missing LED interface description(Table 8), Add reel dimensions to Section 8, Add description for physical factory reset (Section 6), Update hardware sections (Section 2,Section 4,Section 3), Add Section 5, Update Section 10
3	2024-02-08	shoe, nsav, tkla, clip	Update reel dimensions in Table 20, Update Table 8 where M7 must be connected to GND. Update 100BASE-T1 application circuit subsection Section 2.1, Add 100BASE-TX application circuit subsection Section 2.1, Remove wrong specified $T_{4.3}$ for 3V3_OUT in Figure 14, Update max Supply Voltage to 27V (Table 10), Add Input capacitance Table 11, Update Output current Table 11, Update dimension precisions in Section 3.1, Update I2C interface performance parameter to *400 kbit/s ± 20 %* Section 2.2, Update UART interface performance parameters to *1.5 MBaud* Section 2.2, Add RMII interface in hardware block diagram Figure 4, editorial review.
4	2026-04-22	shoe, nsav, mcet	Expose RMII and SGMII signals to Section 4; Fix extra characters for listings to allow copy and paste; add Errata, section Appendix G; add GPIO3/GPIO4 as secondary function to Table 8; add SPI functionality Section 2.2.2;

5	2026-09-07	shoe	Reconcile datasheet with *libperiCORE* 25; rewrite Section 6 — *libperiCORE* 25 only exposes the port state, the application owns the factory-reset trigger; document the link-timeout behavior and the two-power-cycle procedure using `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2`; add Section 4.6 documenting `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_1`, `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_2` and `BOOT_CONFIG_PIN_3`, their pads and the `BootConfigPins` accessors; update Table 8 entries for `K10`, `N8` and `F10` with `CFG` type to reflect their boot-configuration-strap role; add introduction to Section 5; add Section 5.2 with the sampling timing diagram (Figure 15) and timing parameter table (Table 13);
6	2026-05-04	shoe	add pull down for for `K10` in Table 8;
7	2026-09-07	shoe	Enhance description for Section G.2 periCORE TLS certificate validation; Document the function of `DEBUG_EN` — add Section 4.7 and extend the `N3` entry in Table 8; cross-reference it from Section 2.5;